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whether the sentence was imposed "as
a result of' a misapplication of the
Guidelines depends on ''whether the
district court would have imposed the
same sentence had it not relied upon
the invalid factor or factors." Id. Applying this test, the Court noted that
when a district court intentionally departs from the Guideline range, the
court's sentence is "imposed 'as a result of' a misapplication ofthe Guidelines, if the sentence would have been
different but for the district court's
error." Id.
This decision provides substantial
insight into the scope of appellate review under the Guidelines of the Sentencing Reform Act. The Supreme
Court in Williams gave an extremely
narrow reading to the scope of such
review, and emphasized the deference
that appellate courts are to give to a
district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion. In so ruling, the Court
established a national consensus on the
scope of appellate review under the
Sentencing Reform Act.
- Gloria A. Worch
3011 Corp. v. District Court:
CORPORATIONS CHARGED
WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL.
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court,

327 Md.463, 610 A.2d 766 (1992), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a corporation has a right to a trial
by jury when it is charged with a criminal offense carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment in excess of 90
days. In a unanimous decision, the
court interpreted section 4-302(e)(2)(i)
ofMaryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as providing a statutory right to a jury trial based on the
maximum penalty provided for the
offense itselfand not the penalty likely
to be imposed upon a particular defendant. Therefore, although a corporation is not subject to imprisonment, it
is entitled to a jury trial.
3011 Corporation, trading as U.S.
Books, and L.R. News, Inc., trading as

Edgewood Books, were adult book
stores in Harford County. Both corporations were charged with 100 counts
of knowingly displaying sexually oriented material for advertising purposes
in violation ofart. 27, section 416D of
the Maryland Code. Each violation
was punishable by a fine of up to
$1,000 or imprisonment of up to six
months. Both corporations also were
charged with one count of exhibiting
obscene matter in violation of art. 27,
section 418 of the Maryland Code.
The penalty for this charge was up to a
$1,000 fme and/or imprisonment up to
one year. Similar charges were filed
against Larry Hicks, who was an officer of both corporations.
All parties requested a jury trial.
The District Court for Harford County
granted Mr. Hicks's demand for a jury
trial and subsequently tninsferred his
case to the Circuit Court for Harford
County. However, the district court
denied both corporations' request for a
jury trial and the corporations filed
petitions for writs of certiorari to the
Circuit Court for Harford County. After
a hearing, the petitions were dismissed
and the corporations appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals ofMaryland.
While the appeal was pending, the
counts for exhibiting obscene material
were dismissed. Before argument in
the court of special appeals, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ
of certiorari to determine whether a
corporation charged in district court
with a criminal offense carrying a penalty in excess of 90 days had a right to
a jury trial.
Thecorporations argued in the court
of appeals that they had a statutory
right to jury trial under section 4302(e)(2)(i) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, and that they were
entitled to a constitutional right to a
jury trial under Articles 5,21, and 23 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 3011 Corp., 327 Md. 46768, 610 A.2d 768. The State argued
that no corporation ever has the right to

ajury trial under the statute because the
statute requires a defendant to be subject to more than 90 days imprisonment and a corporation cannot be imprisoned. Id. at 468, 610 A.2d at 768.
The State contested the Maryland constitutional right to a jury trial by arguing that the charge was a minor offense
to which the right to jury trial does not
attach. Id, 610 A.2dat768-69 (citing,
e.g., State v. Huebner, 305 Md. 601,
608-10,505 A.2d l331,l335 (1986».
The State also argued that there was no
federal constitutional right to a jury
trial for corporations since a corporation could not be imprisoned and the
maximum fines were not substantial.
Id., 610 A.2d at 769.
The court of appeals found a right
to a jury trial through statutory interpretation and did not reach the constitutional issues. The court ruled that if
the crime with which the defendant is
charged carries a penalty of imprisonment in excess of 90 days, a criminal
defendant is entitled to a jury trial ifhe
makes a timely request in district court.
Id. at 469, 610 A.2dat 769. Thecourt
rejected the State's contention that the
particular defendant must be subject to
imprisonment in excess of 90 days,
holding that ''the maximum penalty
provision relates to the offense itself
and not the parti~ular defendant." Id.
(emphasis in original). The court found
that the Maryland General Assembly
distinguished between less serious and
more serious criminal offenses by authorizing more than 90 days imprisonment for more serious crimes. Id
Thus, the option of a jury trial was
allowed for offenses with a maximum
penalty in excess of90 days. Id. The
court emphasized that the controlling
principle guiding the constitutional
right to a jury trial is the maximum
sentence and place ofincarceration that
the legislature established for the particular offense, not the maximum sentence or place ofincarceration to which
this particular defendant may be subjected. Id (citingKawamurav. State,
299 Md. 276, 292, 473 A.2d438, 447
(1984». The court found that the Mary-
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land General Assembly used this same
principle in establishing the statutory
right to a jury trial under section 4302(e)(2)(i).
In addition, because one of the
criminal violations was dismissed by
the district court after a jury trial was
demanded by the corporate defendants,
the court ofappeals clarified the effect
of the dismissal on the right to a jury
trial. Id. at 467 n. 6, 610 A.2d at 768 n.
6. The court noted that it considered
the offenses charged at the time ofthe
demand for a jury trial. Id. As long as
the defendant was entitled to a jury trial
at the time ofthe demand, a subsequent
dismissal or nol pros of one of the
charged offenses has no effect on the
right to a jury trial. Id. (citing State v.
Huebner, 305 Md. 601, 606-07, 505
A.2d 1331, 1334 (1986)).
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court,
the court of appeals established that a
corporation has the same statutory right
to a jury trial as an individual charged
with the same criminal offense if the
offense carries a prison sentence in
excess of90 days. In placing its focus
on the statutory penalty, and not the
penalty applicable to the particular
defendant in a case, the court of appeals reaffirmed the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial and the
principle that, although not subject to
imprisonment, corporations are treated
like individuals under the law.
- Kenneth A. Brown
Lee v. Weisman: COURT HOLDS
NON-SECT ARIAN PRAYER AT
SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONY VIOLATES
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION.
InLeev. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992), the United States Supreme
Court held that offering invocation and
benediction prayers as part ofthe formal graduation ceremonies for secondary schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Inso
holding, the Court declined to recon-

sider the three-part Establishment
Clause test set forth in Lemon lI.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
In lune 1989, Deborah Weisman
graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle
School, a public school in Providence,
Rhode Island The school principal
invited a rabbi to deliver prayers in
conjunction with the graduation exercises for the class. The principal provided the speaker with a pamphlet entitled ''Guidelines for Civic Occasions,"
prepared by the National Conference
of Christians andlews. This pamphlet
advised members of the clergy performing the prayers that the invocation
and benediction should be non-sectarian. In this case, the invocation and
benediction were non-sectarian, however, they did contained references to
God.
Prior to Deborah's graduation ceremony, Deborah's father, Daniel
Weisman, in his individual capacity as
a taxpayer and as next friend of
Deborah, sought a temporary restraining order in the United District Court
for the District of Rhode Island.
Weisman sought to prohibit the school
officials from including the prayers in
the graduation ceremony. The court
denied the motion and her family eventually attended the graduation where
the prayers were recited
Thereafter, the case was submitted
to the District Court on stipulated facts.
The court held that the practice of
utilizing prayers in the context of public school graduations violated the
three-part Establishment Clause test
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon
test, in order ''to satisfy the Establishment Clause, a governmental practice
must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) avoid excessive government
entanglement with religion." Weisman,
112 S. Ct. at 2654 (citing Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty lI. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973)). Applying this test, the district
court enjoined the Providence School

Committee from continuing to employ
Id. Specifically, the
school district violated the second prong
ofthe Lemon test by creating an atmosphere in which the state identified
with a religion. Id.
The school officials appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit which agreed with the
holding and rationale of the district
court. Id. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the
issue ofwhether the use of invocations
and benedictions at a public school
graduation violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the
Constitution.
The Court began its analysis by
emphasizing that even though attendance at public school graduation is
voluntary, "attendance and participation [which may include] state-sponsored religious activity are in a 1hlr and
real sense obligatory ..." Id. at 2655.
The Court explicitly refused the invitation to reconsider its decision inLemon,
because the government involvement
with the invocation and benediction at
the public school graduation was ''pervasive, to the point of creating a statesponsored and state directed religious
exercise in a public schooL" Id. The
Court noted that the school principal's
involvement with the composition of
the prayers and the choice ofa rabbi to
perform the prayers was akin to the
State deciding by statute that an invocation and benediction should be given.
Id. at 2655. Along similar lines, the
court reasoned that by providing the
rabbi with a copy ofthe Guidelines for
Civic Occasions, the principal ostensibly "directed and controlled the content of the prayer." Id. at 2656. The
Court asserted that it was inappropriate for government to compose or provide official prayers for recitation at an
event in part sponsored by the government. Id. at 2656 (citing Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962)).
The Court next turned its analysis
to the issue ofcoercive pressure among
students in elementary and secondary
public schools and the n~ to protect
this practice.
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